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Résumé  
The French Tax Credit programme was created in 2001.  This is the first study that 
attempts to evaluate the impact of the measure on employment outcomes using non-
experimental evaluation methods.  The data for the analysis are drawn from the French 
labour force surveys of 1999 to 2002.  The rotating structure of this survey enables us to 
apply panel data methods to the estimation of the model.  We conclude that the programme 
has an insignificant impact on the employment rate of French women.  We do, however, find 
some evidence of a negative and weakly significant impact for married women.   
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The French tax credit programme, “la Prime Pour l’Emploi”, was launched by the Jospin 
government in spring 2001.  This is the first time ever that a tax credit programme has been 
put into force in France.  The American Earned Income Tax Credit was created much earlier 
in 1975, and the British tax credit dates back to at least 1988.  
Tax credits belong to the group of the so-called “in-work” benefits, payable to low-
earnings workers.  One of their aims is to increase work incentives for the low-skilled by 
raising income from work relative to unemployment income.  There is a huge literature 
reviewing and evaluating the impact of this type of measures on employment outcomes in 
Anglo-saxon countries (see, for example, Blundell, 2005, and Blundell and Hoynes, 2003).  
The main conclusions from these studies are that tax credits have little employment effects 
with the notable exception of American lone parents for whom the EITC is normally found to 
have increased the incentives to work.  On the other hand, adverse negative effects of the 
programme on the employment rates of married women1 have been reported for the case of 
the EITC (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).   
Like the EITC and the WFTC, the French tax credit is conditional on total household 
resources.  Individuals with some important sources of non-work income or with a high-
income partner are excluded from the program.  The threshold level of total income for 
eligibility varies roughly between 24 and 30 thousand euros for dual-earners households, 
depending on the presence and the number of dependent children.  Half of French households 
filing a tax form fall below the income threshold for eligibility to the tax credit2.  On the other 
hand, contrarily to the Anglo-Saxon programmes, the French tax credit is not targeted at 
working “parents”.  Childless individuals are entitled to the measure and, further to this, 
additions for dependent children are not very tangible, being equal to 30 euros per year and 
per dependent child3.   
According to government sources, over eight millions of French taxpayers were paid a 
tax credit in year 2001, for a total disbursement of over one thousand millions of euros.  This 
                                                           
1 Here one should actually talk about married “mothers” rather than “women”, as the EITC is conditional on 
being at work and having dependent children.   This was also the case for the British Working Family Tax Credit 
until the 2004 reform which has made the credit available also to childless workers. 
2 The earnings thresholds and the total household income bound for eligibility to the tax credit were modified 
only slightly by later reforms, therefore not affecting much these conclusions.   
3 Lone parents are entitled to yearly additions of 60 euros for the first child and 30 euros for each other one.  
These children’s additions have remained unchanged under later reforms, the claim being that other policy 
measures take care of the (additional) financial needs of (working) parents in France.   
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means that about one every three French workers were paid a tax credit, for an average 
amount of 150 euros per household4, which corresponds to roughly 1% of the minimum wage 
in the same year.  This profile contrasts with records of over one million recipients of the 
Working Family Tax Credit in the UK, for an average yearly expenditure of over 2500 euros 
per household, and nearly 20 millions recipients of the EITC in the USA, with an average 
expenditure of almost 700 euros per household.   
The French tax credits are the largest for workers earning approximately the minimum 
wage.  Payments are phased out for individuals earning between the minimum wage and 
roughly 1.4 of the minimum wage.  This explains the large number of recipients and it is, 
indeed, not surprising given that the distribution of wages in France is very compressed 
around the minimum wage. 
This is the first study that makes an attempt to evaluate the impact of the French 
programme on employment using non-experimental evaluation methods.  Earlier French 
studies were all based on simulations models, built on data drawn before the policy was 
implemented, as reviewed in Stancanelli and Sterdyniak (2004).  According to the earlier 
findings, the employment effects of the tax credit, were small, if any at all, amounting to at 
most a few thousands new jobs, for women in the age range 25-49,  according to the most 
reliable estimations.    
We focus here on the employment effects of the policy for women5, disregarding 
differential incentives on the supply of hours of work for individuals in the phase in or the 
phase out of the programme, given that the choice of working hours is known to be rigid and 
mostly determined by employers in the French labour market (see, for example, Bourguignon 
and Magnac, 1990).  An overwhelming number of French workers report not to have any 
control of their working hours, according to different surveys.      
According to theoretical a priori, tax credits should increase the employment rate of 
eligible persons, by raising income from work relative to unemployment income.  They may, 
however, reduce the incentives to work for married women, were their husbands to be 
                                                           
4 The amounts paid by the tax credit were increased at various instances from the socialists as well as from the 
later liberal governments that have made the tax credit one of their “flag” programmes.   Here we discuss the 
amounts paid according to the first version of the programme which is the one we do evaluate.  It should, 
however, be noticed that the increases only concerned recipients in the phase in, with the remarkable exception 
of the first reform that made up for an “error” in programme design, which was tapering out at a very fast rate 
income in the phase out.   Notwithstanding the increases to the credit payable under the various reforms the 
amounts paid remain, by large, smaller than those paid by the EITC and the WFTC.  
5 French women are generally found to be more responsive than men to policy incentives (see, for example, 
Piketty, 1998; Bourguignon and Magnac, 1990).
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eligible.  As we are looking at the first year the policy was implemented6, one might further 
argue that the announcement of the policy may strengthen its effects7 (positive for all, but 
possibly negative for married women).  On the other hand, payments made by the tax offices, 
on the basis of tax declarations relating to earnings from work and total income one year 
earlier, make the tax credit less tangible and may, therefore, reduce policy responses relative 
to other measures administered, for example, by the welfare offices.  
Here, two different approaches are followed to specifying the “treatment” effect, where 
“treatment” is defined as (potential) eligibility to the policy measure, as standard in the 
evaluation literature.  Under the first approximation, the treatment group is composed of 
women potentially eligible to the policy, on the basis of their estimated earnings and 
household income.  The control group includes women with own earnings just above the 
threshold level for eligibility and women that fail to meet eligibility conditions because of 
their husband’s income.  A somewhat similar approach has been taken in a number of studies 
in the evaluation literature, that estimated the impact of minimum wage increases on 
employment by defining the control group as those workers with earnings just above the 
minimum wage (see, for example, Stewart, 2004 and 2005).    
The alternative approach identifies the policy impact for married women by comparing 
them to cohabiting women, who are not allowed to file joint tax forms with their partner in 
France.  Under this framework, married women are defined as the “treatment” group and 
cohabiting women as the “control” group8.   This is comparable to the strategy followed by 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004), who define couples with children as the EITC treatment group and 
childless couples as the control group, given that the policy is targeted at working households 
with children.  
                                                           
6 The tax credit was actually paid for the first time in the September 2001 to eligible individuals, on the basis of 
their 2001 tax declarations, made in March 2001 and relating to earnings and income in year 2000.  Given that 
the policy was only announced in February 2001, and that the French LFS were run in March of every year, we 
take the first “policy year” to be 2002.   One cannot possibly assume that March 2001 (ie data drawn from the 
French LFS of year 2001) is a policy year, as the tax credit had just been voted at the time the survey was carried 
out.   
7 Blundel et al. (2004) evaluating the impact of a new UK programme for young unemployed, find important 
“programme introduction effects”.  According to their estimates, the impact of the policy was much larger in the 
first quarter after being introduced than in successive quarters. 
8 Here, one could actually re-inverse the conclusions, by defining cohabiting women as the treatment group and 
married women as the control group, given that the model aims at identifying the impact of the tax credit on 
employment, by exploiting the fact that cohabiting women cannot file joint tax forms and are, consequently, 
entitled to the tax credit independently from the situation of their partner.       
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We use data from the French Labour Force Surveys of years 1999 to 20029 to estimate 
our evaluation model.  The rotating structure of this survey enables us to estimate an 
(unbalanced) panel data model of the employment probability, in addition to pooled cross-
sections dichotomous probability models.     
On the basis of our estimation results, we conclude that the tax credit has no significant 
impact on the employment rate of French women.  We do, however, find some evidence of a 
negative and weakly significant effect for married women.  In particular, according to our 
estimates, the marginal effect of the policy on the employment rates of married women would 
lie between 0.5% and 1.3%, suggesting a destruction of 20 to 50 thousands jobs in 2002.   
The structure of the paper is the following.  The next section spells out more in detail the 
workings of the French tax credit programme and provides some background information on 
the French labour market.  In Section 3, the estimation model is laid out.   The specification of 
the treatment and control groups is the object of Section 4. The data and the selection of the 
sample for analysis are described in Section 5.  Descriptive sample statistics are given in 
Section 6.  The results of estimation are presented in Section 7.  The last section concludes the 
paper.   
 
2. The French tax credit and the local labour market 
The French tax credit programme, called “Prime Pour l’Emploi”, which means namely “a 
premium to work”, was launched by the socialist government, headed by the Prime Minister 
Jospin, in Spring 2001.  This measure belongs to the family of so called “in-work benefits” 
that have been adopted in a number of OECD countries starting from the seventies, with two 
main objectives.  The first is to fight the increasing poverty rates of low-skilled workers, 
redistributing income towards the “working poor”.  The second is to reduce “unemployment 
traps” -that occur when the household income from work is not much larger than the income 
received when unemployed- and, by doing so, to increase the incentives to work.  In most 
countries, in-work benefits have been targeted at workers from households with dependent 
children, as for them the risk of poverty is among the highest and unemployment traps are 
                                                           
9 As from year 2003 the design of the French labour force surveys was changed dramatically.  Starting from 
2003, the survey is run four times a year;  a new questionnaire has been written; and half of the interviews (the 
second and the third) are done by telephone, rather than by person at the house of the respondent.  According to 
the French national statistical offices (INSEE, 2003), the new LFS surveys are not comparable to the earlier 
annual surveys.  In particular, information on respondents’ employment status can not be compared, which 
makes it unfeasible for us to extend the analysis to 2003 and later policy years.   
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often the more severe.  When in-work benefits are administered by the tax offices, rather than 
by the social security administration, they are also called “tax credits”.  
The American Earned Income Tax Credit is perhaps the most well-known in-work 
benefit system world-wide.  There is a huge economic literature evaluating its impact on 
poverty and employment, as well the advantages and disadvantages of administering the 
benefits via the tax offices.  In-work benefits are in force since a long time also in the United 
Kingdom and Australia.  A number of OECD countries like, for example, the Netherlands has 
at some stage considered whether to introduce them (see Nelissen et al, 2005, and Nelissen 
and Van Soest, 2003, for a simulation of the impact of in-work benefits on employment in the 
Dutch labour market).  
The French tax credit was actually introduced to compensate the low-end of the 
distribution of tax payers for tax reductions granted to the wealthier households.  Within the 
“family” of OECD in-work benefits, it stands out as a “hybrid” measure as it attempts to 
achieve a number of different objectives, such as, for example, discouraging small-hours part-
time jobs and rewarding full-time “minimum wage” workers.  Individuals with very little 
earnings over the year or working few hours in low-paid jobs are not eligible to the tax credit.   
The tapering off of benefits is such that benefits are the largest at about the minimum wage 
level and decrease thereafter.   
Alike other in work-benefits schemes in OECD countries, the benefits paid increase with 
the number of dependent children for eligible workers and more so for lone parents in-work, 
but “children additions” are extremely small.  An eligible lone parent is entitled to a 60 euros 
yearly addition for the first child and to 30 euros extra for each other child.  The children 
addition for married parents is equal to 30 euros per dependent child, while the addition for a  
dependent spouse is 78 euros per year.  Childless workers are also entitled to the tax-credit.  
The French scheme is, to our knowledge, the only one that is payable to the individual 
rather than the household, in spite of being means-tested on total household income10, which 
implies that in some households both husband and wife may receive a tax credit, if they both 
satisfy the eligibility conditions.  
Eligibility conditions to the French tax credit can be spelled out as follows (see Table1):  
1. Having worked at least part of the (fiscal) year and having earned more than roughly 
0.3 of the minimum wage (about 3200 euros) and less than about 1.4 of the minimum wage 
                                                           
10 Individualisation of the tax credit could not be completely independent from the income of the other partner, 
as filing joint tax declarations is compulsory for married couples in France.  
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(almost 15000 euro), on a yearly base11.  The upper earnings bound is shifted up to almost 
twice the minimum wage (almost 23000 euros) for those with a dependent spouse or with a 
spouse earning less than 0.3 of the minimum wage.   
2. Reporting total taxable household income below roughly 12000 euros12, for single 
people, and approximately 24000 euros, for married couples.  This total income bound is  
increased by over 3000 euros for each dependent child13.  
The reason for setting the lowest earnings bound was to discourage small hours part-time 
jobs.  However, few French workers fall below the lowest earnings bound for eligibility:  
roughly less than 3 per cent of female workers, according to the LFS14.   But almost 60% of 
working women have earnings below the upper earnings bound, which is not surprising given 
the compressed shape of the earning distribution at around the minimum wage in France and 
the fact that French women’s earnings are still well below those of men15.   The income 
bound is not much more binding as roughly half of French households filing a tax declaration 
fall below the income bound.  
One is then not surprised to find out from official tax statistics that over eight million 
French households were paid a tax credit in 2001, that is to say one every three workers.  
                                                           
11 Full-time equivalent (taxable) earnings are computed for individuals having worked part-time and/or only part 
of the year, to determine the upper bound for earnings.   This scaling is not applied to the lower earnings bound, 
which is computed on the basis of actual yearly (taxable) earnings.   
12 Here, one could be misled into thinking that the earnings bound for single people is never binding as it 
appears at first sight to be larger than the income bound for eligibility, but this is not actually true as these 
bounds are defined in terms of “taxable” earnings and “taxable” income, and the rate at which total income is 
taxed is much lower than that for earnings from work, in the French tax system.  As an approximation, roughly 
72% of total income would be subject to income taxes against almost 100% of income from work.  
13   The earnings and total income bounds have been slightly increased every tax year.  For the purposes of our 
analysis, the bounds announced in year 2001 are relevant, and were, therefore given above.  The policy year we 
consider is 2002.  The relevant LFS survey was carried out in March 2002.   At that time, individuals knew the 
eligibility bounds announced in 2001, but they did not know yet the bounds for 2002. In practice, given the time 
disconnection between the decision to work and the payment of the tax credit, the actual rules determining the 
payment of tax credits for the individuals in our sample, will be those fixed in 2003, as individuals file their tax 
declarations in March of each year.  However, the relevant tax parameters for the purposes of our analysis are 
clearly those announced in 2001, as these were the only one known to individuals at the time of carrying out the 
2002 LFS survey.  
14 We take here as a reference the raw weighted mean number of women earning less than 0.3 of the minimum 
wage in the years before the policy was introduced, knowing that the LFS only surveys earnings at one snapshot 
point in time, so that we are bound to underestimate this statistic.  Moreover, LFS earnings information is self-
reported, and, therefore, subject to reporting and recall error.  Discarding from the sample, individuals that report 
to earn less than (half) the official minimum wage on a hourly base, one is left with almost no observations 
falling below the lower earnings bound for eligibility to the tax credit, which is what actually happens in our 
estimation sample.   This is more so as we replace observed earnings with predicted earnings to determine 
eligibility to the tax credit for all women in our sample, on the one hand, to make up for unobserved earnings of 
women out of work and, on the other hand, to control for possible endogeneity of earnings.   
15 Roughly 20% below on the basis of raw differences.  
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The large coverage of the credit contrasts with its small importance.  The amounts paid 
(see Table 2) were equal in 2001 to 4,4% of reported (full-time equivalent) earnings for 
salaries between 0,3 times the minimum wage and the minimum wage and decreased for 
earnings between the minimum wage and approximately 1,4 times the minimum wage (the 
phase out).  Payments are, therefore, the largest for full-time workers earning the minimum 
wage16.    
 In 2001, the total public expenditure on tax credit payments was of over one thousand 
millions of euros, equal to an average amount of 150 euros per year per household, 
representing roughly 1% of the minimum wage at that time.  This profile contrasts with 
records of over one million recipients of the Working Family Tax Credit in the UK, for an 
average yearly expenditure of over 2500 euros per household, and nearly 20 millions 
recipients of the EITC in the USA, with an average expenditure of almost 700 euros per 
household.   
However, the employment effects of tax credit programmes are not just a function of the 
amounts paid.  For example, the UK measure has been found to be less effective than the 
USA one.  According to Blundell  and Hoynes (2003), the differences in employment 
outcomes of the EITC and the WFTC can be at least partly explained by the interactions with 
other tax benefits schemes (unemployment benefits for households with dependent children 
being much more generous in the UK than in the USA, for example) as well as by the general 
economic context (the booming economy in the USA in the mid nineties).  When times are 
good, employment effects of in-work benefits may be larger as the  larger jobs offer may 
allow individuals to really trade-off between working or not, on the basis of the expected 
gains from work.  When (structural) unemployment is high, in-work benefits may play less of 
a role.   
Let us then take a look at the French labour market.  French GDP growth rate declined in 
the policy year 2002 (see Figure a, in the Appendix, for a picture of French GDP over the last 
twelve years), but this seems to have had little impact on the upward trend in the employment 
rates of (married) women, while men’s employment fell in 2002.  The employment rates of 
French (married) women are trended up over time and they appear to be less sensitive to the 
economic cycle than the employment rates of French men (see Figure 1). The earlier 
economic recession of 1993 seems to have had a larger impact on employment trends than the 
more recent one.  On the other hand, if one looks at trends in the average and median wages 
                                                           
16 Later reforms increased these from 4.4% to 4.6% of  earnings.  
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over the same period of time, it is possible to detect some spikes in the average wage at 
recession years (see Figure 2), which is presumably due to a larger proportion of low-wage 
workers leaving the labour market during bad years.  But median female wages seem to be 
less affected from the cycle than those of men.   
Generally speaking, overall wage growth was moderate in the 2000s, partly because of 
the working time reductions that were negotiated against salary moderation for the firms 
concerned, partly because of the economic downturn, so that relatively small increases in 
income from work due to the tax credit might have been quite tangible.  Looking at 
employment rates of women by marital status, one can see that married women’s employment 
lags far below that of single women, so that it might actually be desirable to target 
employment policies at married women.  This makes it even more relevant for policy 
purposes to test whether the introduction of the tax credit may have had a discouraging impact 
on married women’s employment rates. For example, there is some evidence that parental 
leave programmes created in the nineties have had a negative impact on the employment rates 
of French low-skilled women (see, for example, Piketty, 1998).   
 
3.  The evaluation model 
We apply a difference in differences approach to estimate the employment effects of the 
French tax credit programme.  Using non experimental data, the impact of the programme is 
measured by the difference between the employment probability of individuals potentially 
eligible for the policy (the treatment group) and that of not eligible ones (the control group), 
before and after the policy change.  There is nowadays a vast literature that applies this 
counterfactual method to the evaluation of labour market programmes.   
The validity of this non-experimental policy evaluation method rests, however, on a 
number of (strong) hypotheses.  The first is that the employment probability of the control 
group is not affected by the policy change.  In our case, we assume that individuals with 
earnings and income just above the programme eligibility thresholds do not or cannot modify 
their labour market behaviour to participate in the programme.   
The second important assumption is that the difference between the employment 
probabilities of the two groups is time invariant, i.e; that the employment probabilities of the 
two groups are not affected differently by the business cycle or other institutional changes that 
may have taken place during the same period.  In this respect, in France at about the same 
time when the tax credit was introduced, some other policies changes occurred that might 
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have stimulated employment of the low-skilled.  These included the possibility of continuing 
to receive housing benefits as well as social security benefits while taking up work for the 
previously unemployed.  Further to this, some small and medium size enterprises joined in the 
“35 hours” working-week agreement during that time, as the 35 hours reform was fragmented 
over time.  And some measures to reduce employers’ social security contributions rates on 
low-skilled people were implemented in the 2000s.  However, none of these programmes 
were administered by the tax administration.  They all treated married and cohabiting women 
alike, unlike the tax credit.  Furthermore, the earnings and income conditions determining 
eligibility to the tax credit programme apply to all workers and not just to the segment of the 
labour market which were previously unemployed and receiving welfare (social security 
assistance) benefits.  The “35 hours” working-week applies only to workers of the enterprises 
concerned.  The employers’ contributions reductions on the low-skilled were timed somewhat 
differently than the tax credit measure.  It follows that our approach should enable us to 
disentangle the impact of the introduction of the tax credit from that of other policy changes.   
Finally, for the difference-in-differences approach to be meaningful, the assigned control 
group should be as close as possible to the treatment group, without however being eligible 
for the programme.  Given that ineligible women have higher earnings than the eligible ones, 
it is difficult to draw a control group that is very close to the treatment group.  We dealt with 
this issue, by including in the control group married women that fail eligibility because of 
their husband’s income, and also by adopting an alternative approach where treatment is 
completely independent from earnings (see Section 4 for more details).   
We focus here on the impact of the tax credit programme on the employment rate of 
women.  Let us define E as a binary variable taking value one if individuals are employed, 
and zero if they are not17. Our estimating model is a dichotomous probability model of the 
employment probability:   
 
1)Pr( 1| ) ( ' 1999 1 2 2 )
1,...,
it it it it it it it it it E x G z PPE y y y PPE y
tT




                                                           
17 Here we have chosen to look at the employment probability.  Alternatively, one could have focused on the 
participation probability like Eissa and Williamson Hoynes (1999) do.   We feel that drawing the line between 
unemployment and other out-of-work states is not clear-cut, especially as different “definitions’ of 
unemployment are available in the French LFS for the period of time that we look at.    
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where z are individual characteristics, PPE is a dichotomus variable taking value one for 
individuals potentially eligible to the policy programme, y1999, y2001 and y2002 are year 
dummies, the interaction variable PPE times year 2002 measures the policy impact, and ϑ  
summarizes the vector of parameters to be estimated.  The additional regressors included in 
the vector z control for individual characteristics, family composition, and local labour market 
conditions (see the data section for more details).  For the purposes of our difference-in-
differences model, the years 1999 to 2001 are used as control years.  In 1999 and 2000 the 
introduction of the tax credit had not been announced yet.  The year 2001 serves also a 
reference year for our analysis, as the LFS survey was carried out in March 2001 and the 
policy measure was implemented in Spring 2001.  The year 2002 is the treatment or “policy” 
year.   The underlying model is:   
* 2) ' 1999 2001 2002 2002 it it it it it it it it it E x PPE y y y PPE y β αυ δ ψγ =+ + + + + + ε  
and if the error term is normally distributed, G(⋅) in equation (1) is equal to a standard 
cumulative normal distribution under a probit specification: 
3) ( ) ) , )
x
Gx x vd v φ
−∞
=Φ ( = ( ∫       
1/2 2 ) (2 ) exp( /2), xx φπ
− (= −
If the error term follows a logit specification, G(⋅) in equation (1) is a standard cumulative 
logit distribution: ( ) ) exp( )/[1 exp( )] Gx x x x = Λ( = + .  
The corresponding log-likelihood is: 
 
[ ] [ ] 4) ( ) log () (1 )log 1 () ii i lE G E G ϑ =⋅ + − − ⋅
                                                          
 
 
If we assume additionally unobserved individual effects,  , the model becomes:  i c
5)Pr( 1| , ) Pr( 1| , )
( ' 1999 1 2 2 , )
1,...,
it i i it it i
it it it it it it it i
Ex c Ex c
G z PPE y y y PPE y c
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+ + + 200 + 200 + 200
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Under our preferred specification, the  are unobserved cluster effects i c 18, to allow for 
correlation of the observations over time and : 
 
18 This model is called a “population average” panel data model in STATA, taking perhaps somewhat 
misleading from the biological literature where such models with clustered observations were implemented first.   
The advantage of this specification of the random error model is that it is very flexible and, in particular, it 
allows for specifying robust standard errors.  
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.  
Models (1) and (6) are estimated by using robust standard errors, to account for the 
possibility of serial dependence.  Some authors have highlighted the importance of accounting 
for possible serial correlation in the context of difference-in-differences models (see, for 
example, Bertrand et al., 2001).  Serial correlation may seriously bias the standard errors of 
the model, though it appears to be more of a problem in the case of long-time series data (see 
also Kezdi, 2002).  In our model, serial correlation may arise due to correlation of the 
explanatory variables over time.  This may especially be the case for the binary treatment 
variable determining eligibility to the programme.  Serial correlation may also come about 
from highly positively correlated values of the dependent variable over time.  To control for 
possible serial correlation, robust standard errors are specified using the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator. 
 
4.  The specification of the treatment and control groups 
  To implement the model we construct next, the treatment and control groups.   We 
follow here two different approaches.  Under the first, more “conventional”, the treatment is 
determined on the basis of the rules that determine eligibility to the tax credit, while the 
control group is constructed “ad hoc”, using similar information.   A similar approach has 
been adopted, for example, in a number of studies that estimated the impact of minimum 
wage increases on employment, where the control group was made up of workers with 
earnings just above the minimum wage (see, for example, Stewart, 2004 and 2005). 
Under the second one, to identify possible differential effects for married women than for 
unmarried ones, we define the “treatment” as being married and the “control” as living 
together.  Women unmarried but living together cannot file joint tax declarations19 and should 
not, therefore, respond to the negative incentives found in some of the EITC literature for 
                                                           
19 Only those cohabiting couples that have signed a “pacs” (“pacte civil de solidarité”), i.e; signed an official 
contract of living together at the local city council, are allowed to file joint tax forms, and this only after three 
years have elapsed since their “pacs” was signed.    This means that in our dataset, only those cohabiting couples 
that had signed a pacs in 1999 (and were surveyed) could have opted for making a joint tax declaration.  Now  
“pacsing” is only possible in France since 1999 and in that year 72631 “pacs” were signed, some of which may 
have been contracted by homosexual couples, which are not under study here.  Even  ignoring this last caveat, 
and assuming that all couples “pacsed” opted for making joint tax declarations, which seems quite unlikely, and 
that further all of these were surveyed, which would also be quite rare, one would conclude that at most 3.5% of 
the cohabiting couples in our sample could have made a joint tax declaration in 2002.  This should, therefore, 
hopefully not matter for the means of our analysis.  
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married women (see, for example, Eissa and Williamson Hoynes, 2004).  Under this 
assumption, we assume that the difference in employment probabilities of married and 
cohabiting women in the policy year(s) relative to earlier years, is due to the introduction of 
the tax credit.  This resembles somewhat the approach taken by Eissa and Willliamson-
Hoynes (2004) that, in one of their specifications, defined couples with children as the 
treatment group and childless couples as the control group -as the EITC is targeted at working 
households with children.  
To follow the first approach, where the treatment and control groups are made up on the 
basis of eligibility rules, we start off by predicting earnings for women out of work.  Given 
that entitlement to the tax credit is conditional on the level of income from work, and that 
earnings are bound to be endogenous in a model of the employment probability, we replace 
actual earnings with predicted earnings for all women in our sample20.  Therefore, we use 
predicted (hourly) earnings to determine eligibility.   To this end, we estimate a Heckman 
selection model of wages for year 200021, by specifying hourly wages, , and participation,  i w
i p , as follows:  
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Women that reported working on more than one job are excluded from the wage model, 
as well as those with missing working hours. The regressors of the wage equation include a 
polynomial in age, a quadratic in experience, education level dummies, and a dummy for 
residing in the region of Paris, as salaries tend to be higher there, following the cost of living.  
The explanatory variables of the employment participation equation are the same as those 
                                                           
20 Actually, this turns out to be the same approach taken, after all, by Eissa and Williamson Hoynes (2004) that 
were dealing with similar issues.  
21 We opted for estimating the wage model using data drawn earlier that the introduction of the tax credit, to 
avoid any possible endogeneity of wages, programme participation and employment outcomes.   
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included in the wage equation plus variables relating to marital status, presence and age of 
children, and nationality.  The results of estimation are reported in Table B, in the Appendix 
to the paper.  Hourly earnings are found to increase significantly with higher education levels. 
They increase significantly with experience but at a decreasing rate and they are non-linear in 
age.  Salaries in the region of Paris appear to be significantly higher on average than salaries 
in other livelihoods. The estimated  lambda is statistically significant and positive suggesting 
that selection is an issue here.  
To define the treatment group, for which PPE is equal to one, we apply to our data the 
programme earnings and total-household-income thresholds, as defined by the tax credit rules 
announced in year 2001 (see Table 1 for more details). The employment status (and earnings) 
of the partner, if any, are assumed to be unaffected by the policy measure22.  Total income is 
set up equal to women’s predicted earnings from work plus the income of their husband, for 
married women (see next section for more information on this and other data issues).   
To be eligible to the tax credit, women must have earnings above the lower eligibility 
threshold (roughly 0.3 of the minimum wage)23 and below the upper threshold (around 1.4 of 
the minimum wage).  The upper earnings threshold is larger for married women with a non-
employed husband or a husband earning less than the lower earnings bound.  While the lower 
threshold relates to actual (taxable) yearly earnings, the upper threshold is defined relative to 
full-time equivalent yearly (taxable) earnings.  It follows that actual (taxable) yearly earnings 
must be adjusted to control for actual hours of work, for individuals working part-time and/or 
only part of the tax year to calculate whether individuals meet the upper-earnings threshold 
condition for eligibility24.   
                                                           
=
22 This is a reasonable assumption, at least as a starting point, and especially within the context of French 
society, where the male chauvinist model is still widespread.  To give an idea, less than one per cent of parental 
leave takers are fathers and even the take up rate of paternal leave, which is shorter and with an earnings 
compensation rate equal to 100%, is far below 100% and much lower than in other European countries.  
23 In the LFS, less than 3% of women have earnings below the lower earnings threshold.   This percentage falls 
dramatically when observations reporting wages below (half) the minimum wage are discarded from the sample 
(see the data section for more details).  In particular, there are no observations below the minimum earnings 
threshold for eligibility to the tax credit in our sample, once we replaced actual earnings with predicted ones.   
24 For this purpose, yearly earnings (W) are set equal to hourly earnings (w) time “annualized” working hours 
(52*h) scaled by the “equivalent full-time earnings factor”, which is equal to 1820 (35*52) over annualized 
hours.  All this comes to the following expression:  
*( *52)*1820/( *52) *1820 *35*52 ii i i Wwh h w w == . 
It follows that for part-time workers actual hours of work cancel out and if one is ready to assume that full-time 
workers work for 35 hours per week, which is not a shocking assumption given that, first of all, many firms have 
introduced a 35 hours working week, and, secondly, that hours of work do not really matter so much for full-
timers, as they are not really paid by the hour, then hours do not matter any longer in our evaluation model.  We 
can therefore reason in terms of  (predicted) hourly earnings to determine eligibility to the tax credit.  With just 
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In addition to passing the earnings test, to be eligible individuals must also have total 
taxable income falling below the income bound.  This last varies with the number of children, 
for all, and with the employment status and earnings of the husband, for married women (see 
Table 1).   
The control group is made up “ad hoc” including:   
a) women with earnings just above the upper earnings threshold for eligibility, and 
earning at most half the minimum wage more than the upper earnings threshold that applies to 
their case;  
b) and married women that fail eligibility because of their husband’s earnings.  
To be more precise, if we define: 
•  “SMIC” (“salaire minimum d’insertion”) as the level of the minimum wage in 
2001;  
•  “WUi” as the upper earnings threshold that applies to the ith woman in the 
sample25;  
•  and Yi as the total household income bound that applies to the ith woman in the 
sample26;   
we include in the control group: 
a)  women earning more than “WUi” and less than “1/2 SMIC + WUi”;  
b)  married women earning less than “WUi” but with a husband’s income such that 
total  household income is larger than Yi.   
Some sensitivity analysis is carried out by setting a looser bound for group a above, by 
including in the control group women with earnings up to the upper earnings threshold that 
applies to their case plus the minimum wage, i.e; earning more than “WUi” and less than 
“WUi” + “SMIC”.    Group b stays  the same as above.  The treatment group is not affected 
either.   
Next, we split up the sample for estimation according to women’s marital status, to test 
for a differential impact of the policy on women with different situations.  We distinguish 
single women –including never married, divorced and widowed women- from married 
women and cohabiting ones.  Given the relatively short time period covered and the bounds 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
one caveat for the lower earnings threshold which is independent from hours of work.  But in the case of our 
sample, there are no observations falling below this threshold (see footnote 24).  
25 The upper earnings threshold varies between married and unmarried women (see Table 1).  
26 The total-household-income bound for eligibility varies with the number of children, marital status, and 
employment status and earnings of the husband.      
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set on age (see Section 5 below on data construction), marital status is quite stable for women 
in our sample27 (see Figure C in the Appendix for an overview of trends in marriage rates for 
French women of all ages).    
The other approach we take to defining the treatment and control groups, focuses on the 
employment impact of the tax credit for married women by defining the “treated” as married 
women and the “untreated” as cohabiting women.  Cohabiting women will be eligible for the 
tax credit irrespective of their partner’s income. This strategy should enable us to test for the 
impact of the conditioning on total household resources -as one of the eligibility requirements 
of the tax credit- on the employment choices of married women.  
Descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups under the two approaches, are 
given in section 6, after having described the data and the selection of the sample for analysis 
in Section 5 below.   
 
5.  The data and the selection of the sample for analysis  
The sample for analysis is drawn from the French Labour Force Surveys of years 1999 to 
2002.  This survey has a rotating sample structure which enables one to construct an 
(unbalanced) longitudinal panel sample.  Around 60,000 households are interviewed each 
year in March, with a third of the sample being replaced each year28, which means that 
individuals are kept in the survey for at most three years.   
For our analysis, we select from each survey year a sample of women that are either 
household heads (“personne de reference du ménage”) or spouse of the head29.  Additionally, 
we select only observations that were aged over 16 years and less than 52 years at the time of 
each survey30.  Until age 16, school is compulsory in France.  Special labour market 
                                                           
27 About 97-98 per cent of married women (that stay on in the sample), remain married over three year’s 
intervals and 94 per cent of single women do not change their status.  Cohabiting women tend to change status 
more often: 76-78 per cent continues to be so over three-year periods. 
28 The structure of this annual survey has been changed dramatically as from year 2003.  Interviews now take 
place every quarter; the survey questionnaire has been heavily revised; and two out of four interviews take place 
by telephone rather than at the home of the respondent.  According to the National Statistical offices the data are 
not comparable to those drawn from earlier surveys (see INSEE, 2003).  
29 This implies, in particular, that we drop young women still living at home with their parents, that may be more 
difficult to follow from one year to the next.    
30 We apply this age selection criterion to both husbands (and cohabiting men) and wives, to ensure that there 
are no interactions with other labour market policies that may affect individual behaviour, as having ones’ 
husband entering early retirement may affect a woman’s labour market behaviour.      
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programmes apply to individuals aged 55 and over31, who are, for example, exempted from 
searching for a job while receiving unemployment benefits, and protected from dismissal, if 
in-work (by the so called “Delalande” law which obliges employers to pay extra-
compensation money  for the dismissal of older workers).   
Self-employed women were dropped from the sample as their earnings were not surveyed 
by the LFS of 1999-2002.  Moreover, self-employed income is typically more likely to be 
affected by (mis-)reporting errors than income from dependent work.  In addition to this, only 
women reporting to be either employed or unemployed, on a broad range of criteria32, or 
housewives were kept in the sample.  Full-time students and trainees as well as retired women 
were discarded from the sample.  Along the same lines, women with a self-employed 
husband, or a retired husband or an employed husband that did not report earnings from work 
were also dropped from the sample, to enable us to apply the total household income 
conditions for eligibility to the tax credit33.  
Other studies of French labour supply eliminate from the sample for analysis also women 
that are public sector employees, as most of them34 have a special social security status - for 
example, they have special pension and retirement arrangements- which goes together with a 
long-term employment contract, so that they enjoy a lower probability of leaving or loosing 
their job than other comparable individuals in the private sector.  Here, we keep these women 
in the sample for a number of reasons.  First of all, we cannot exclude that some transitions 
from non-participation, unemployment or other employment statuses to the status of public 
employee will take place.  For this reason, we also want to include public workers in our 
sample and account for their wages in the wage regression to predict earnings for non-
employed people.  Secondly, women tend to be over-represented among public sector 
                                                           
31 We set the limit at 52, rather than 55, as we do not want to have in our panel data model people that will be 55 
and over in the policy year.  
32 In addition to the ILO definition of unemployment, the survey also includes subjective questions on the 
individual occupation, covering employment, unemployment and house-work, among other things.   
33 The LFS 1999-2002 only asked for income of dependent workers or unemployed persons.  Pensions and other 
income sources were not surveyed.  Roughly nine per cent (1800) of married women in our (final) sample were 
dropped because of missing information on their husbands’ earnings from work.   An alternative possibility 
would have been to predict earnings for employed (salaried) husbands but that would have added to the noise 
around the boundaries of the treatment and the control group.     
34 Notice, however, that a considerable number of people are hired in the public sector, at all levels, with a 
“short-term” contract.  There is actually no statutory limit to renewals and to total contract duration of   “short-
term” contracts in the French public sector.  However, one cannot assume that all “short-term contracts” are 
equivalent to “long-term” contracts as an increasing number of them do actually end, partly as a result of labour 
shedding and restructuring, partly because of the growing number of employment promotion programs, and 
partly because of the changes in the ruling political party.     
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employees and them being the focus of our analysis, throwing public employees away we 
may end up with a non-representative selected sample of women.   
Some women in the sample report hourly earnings below the minimum wage. Cross-
checking observations with unusually low earnings against an indicator of unreliable survey 
responses provided in the survey, we could not find any correlation between the two.  We 
could not find any evidence that women reporting less than the hourly minimum wage were 
misreporting their wages.  Moreover, in France, in jobs like babysitting, workers may happen 
to earn less than the hourly minimum wage.  The standard contract for these household 
employees distinguishes between “active” and “passive” hours of work, where “active” hours 
of work amount to 2/3 of the actual working time and they are the ones actually paid for by 
the employers.  For these reasons, we have resolved to draw the line at half the hourly 
minimum wage and drop those observations earning less than this from our sample35.   
Finally, we drop women that have more than one job, which represent about 2.5% of the 
(final) sample (about 600 observations), in each of the years considered.  On the one hand,  
only earnings and hours of work in the “main job” are surveyed and, on other hand, it would 
be difficult to predict (total) earnings for these women.    
Having selected according to the criteria above the sample for analysis, we end up with   
roughly 24-25,000 women for each year considered.  Women are next matched to their 
partners, if any, and all observations are pooled over the four-year period considered, from 
year 1999 to year 2002.  The rotating structure of the sample allows us to construct an 
unbalanced panel.  Over four thousands women36, selected according to the criteria above, 
stay in the sample for periods of three years (from 1999 to 2001 or from 2000 to 2002) and 
between eleven and twelve thousands stay on for two-year intervals.   
As far as variables construction goes, the following comments are in order.  The wage 
information available in the survey relates to usual monthly wages, net of (after) employee 
payroll taxes but gross of (before) employee income taxes.  Information on wage bonuses is 
collected in a separate question.  We add wage bonuses to women’s monthly wages to 
compute the total monthly wage.  Information on usual weekly working hours is used to 
compute the hourly wage.   
Total income is constructed as the sum of the income of the two partners.  To determine 
eligibility to the tax credit, total income is computed setting women’s earnings equal to their 
                                                           
35 In any case, we replace actual earnings with predicted ones for all observations, including these ones, so 
actual earnings only enter the estimation of predicted earnings in the model.  
36 Over eight thousands in total, for the two three-year periods. 
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predicted earnings.  The income of the husband is added to the total income variable to 
determine eligibility to the tax credit.  Husbands’ income includes earnings from work or 
unemployment benefits when available. Other sources of income are not taken into 
consideration here, as they were not collected by the survey.  No information is available on 
non-wage income except for unemployment benefits37.  We assume that income from 
property or interests on savings are on average negligible.  This does not seem as a too strong 
an assumption given that we restrict attention to low-paid workers.  Taxable income is 
computed by applying a standard approximation38.   
Education level dummies are increasing in educational level, the basis being the highest 
education level, equivalent to a university degree.  Experience is computed by subtracting age 
at the end of formal schooling from current age. 
To account for local labour market conditions, we have constructed a series of dummies 
for the region of residence, with base “Ile-de-France”, the region of Paris.  The other regional 
areas are as defined by the survey:  «  Bourgogne » ;    « Champagne »  and  « Ardenne » ; 
« Haute  Normandie » ;  « Basse  Normandie » ;  « Picardie » ;  « Centre » ;  « Calais » ; 
« Lorraine » ;  « Alsace » ;  « Franche-Comte » ;  « Loire » ;  « Bretagne » ;  « Poitou-
Charentes » ;  « Aquitanie » ;  « Midi”  and  “Pyrenées”  ; “Limousin”  ; “Rhones-Alpes”  ; 
“Auvergnes” ; “Languedoc” and “Roussillon” ; “Provence”, “Cote d’Azur” and “Corse”.   
The area of residence dummies account additionally for the size of the agglomeration 
where individuals reside:  
a)  small cities include rural neighbourhoods or urban neighbourhoods with less 
than 20,000 inhabitants;  
b)  large cities are those with more than 200,000 inhabitants;  
c)  Paris stands on its own as the largest urban agglomeration in France;  
The base for these dummies are medium size cities with a population of 20,0000  to 200,000 
inhabitants.  Given that “Paris” accounts for a large share of the population of “Ile-de-
France”, we only enter “Ile-de-France” in our regressions.  
 
                                                           
37 Information on unemployment income from the LFS is not generally considered to be very good.   However, 
only a small number (between 4 and 6 per cent) of the husbands in our sample are unemployed in each of the 
years considered.   Moreover, earnings conditions matter more than total household income, as over half of 
French households filing tax forms passes the total income test for eligibility to the tax credit, but only one every 
three workers gets it.       
38 This is done by multiplying pre-tax income by a factor of 0.72, which takes into account various provisions 
concerning both what part of total income is taxed and at which rate.  
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6.  Descriptive analysis of the data:  the treatment and control groups  
Descriptive statistics of the full data sample selected according to the criteria listed in 
Section 5 above, are given in Table 3, for year 2002, and for the pooled data, covering years 
1999 to 2002.  Descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups, under the two 
approaches described in Section 4 above, are given, respectively, in Table 4 and Table 5, for 
the pooled data.   One should keep in mind, to avoid any confusion, that the models based on 
the treatment and control groups given in Table 4, are also estimated separately for women 
with different marital status, in addition, of course, to being estimated for the full sample.   
From Table 3, one can see that sample characteristics are pretty stable over time, as the 
descriptives for year 2002 are almost identical to those for the 4-year sample –and the same 
applies to the other years (see also Table C in the Appendix).  Around fifty per cent of women 
in the sample are married, at any time; twenty-five per cent are living together and the 
remaining twenty-five per cent are single39.   
 About 70% of women in our sample were potentially eligible for the tax credit at any 
time, according to our estimations.  Using sample weights, this would correspond to a little 
less than eight million women in year 2002.  Now, according to government estimates about 
eight millions and two hundreds households were paid a tax credit in year 2001.  Here we do 
not estimate who does actually get the tax credit, but rather who would be entitled for it, if she 
were to work.  Therefore, it is reasonable that the number of potentially eligible people 
encompasses that of actual recipients.  In particular, about 68% of women in the control group 
were actually employed in year 2002.  The sample percentage of women belonging to the 
control group is 15%, in each of the years considered.   
From Table 4, it emerges that women in the control group enjoy a higher education level 
than those in the treatment group, as anticipated.  It is then not surprising to find out that they 
also have much higher employment rates.  It also turns out that they are more likely to live in 
the region of Paris, suggesting some geographical segregation of (female) labour by skill 
level.  The proportion of single and cohabiting women in the control group is lower than that 
in the treatment group.  This is probably due to the fact that we imposed rule b in addition to 
rule a when constructing the control group (see Section 4 for more details), ie. we included in 
the control group married women that failed eligibility only because of their husbands’ 
income.   The characteristics of the treatment and control groups are fairly stable over time 
                                                           
39 “Single” women include here those that are never married, divorced or widowed.  
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(see Table D in the Appendix, where the same statistics as in Table 4 are shown for the 
treatment and control groups in year 2002).  
The treatment and control groups described in Table 4, were further split up according to 
their marital status into the following groups: married women; unmarried women; further 
distinguished between single and cohabiting women.  Descriptive statistics for married 
women subgroups (given in Table E in the Appendix to the paper) suggest about the same 
patterns as those shown in Table 4.   
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups, constructed 
following the approach whereby married women are considered as the treatment group and 
cohabiting women constitute the control group.  Under this framework, we do not rely on the 
eligibility rules for the construction of the treatment and the control group (see Section 4).  
The two groups compare now fairly well in terms of education levels and area of residence.  
Women living together with a (male) partner but not formally married tend, however, to be 
younger and with a smaller number of children than married women.  They are also more 
likely to be of French nationality than married women are. 
 
7.  Results of estimation  
Results of estimation of the employment probability models specified in Section 3 are 
given, respectively, in Tables 6 and Table 8, for the two different control and treatment 
groups.  Only the “γ” estimates are shown.  Full results of estimation for the logit with 
clustered observations and all covariates of Table 6, our preferred specification, are given in 
Table A, in the Appendix to the paper.  In Table 7, some sensitivity analysis was carried out, 
relative to the models of Table 6, by choosing a larger control group (see end of Section 4 for 
information).   
We estimated logit and probit models on pooled data for the four years and a random 
effects logit, with clustered observations.  All these specifications allow for robust standard 
errors (see Section 3 for more details). 
The estimations were first carried out without controlling for covariates, only including 
treatment and year dummies, in addition to the interaction of treatment and the policy year, 
the “γ” estimate.  Next, covariates were included.  These are a quadratic in age, education 
level dummies, number and age of children, a dummy for French nationality and a number of 
indicators of the area of residence (see Table A in the Appendix).   
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Looking first at Table 6, we find some evidence of a significantly negative impact of 
programme participation for married women, if covariates are not controlled for.  Including 
all covariates makes this negative effect less significant, only at the 10% level.  The negative 
marginal effect is equal to 0.013, according to estimates from the panel logit model, 
suggesting that the tax credit would reduce employment of married women by 1.3%.   This 
would correspond to a reduction of a little less than 50000 jobs.   
In the pooled logit and probit with covariates of Table 6, a weakly significant positive 
effect shows up for cohabiting women.  This becomes, however, not significant once 
unobserved heterogeneity is allowed for in the panel data model.  The “γ” coefficient for 
single women is never significant and negative most of the time.    
In Table 7, where the control group is larger in size –and less comparable to the treatment 
group, as we have included women with higher earnings (see Table F in the Appendix for 
descriptives of sample characteristics) the “γ” estimates are less significant than in Table 6, as 
one would have expected.   A negative and statistically significant coefficient still shows up 
for married women, if covariates are not controlled for.  When adding controls, the estimates 
become significant only at the ten per cent level, in the pooled logit and probit models, but not 
significant in the panel data model.   There is some evidence of a positive and (strongly) 
significant, at the 5% level, coefficient for unmarried women altogether, in all the models but 
the panel data ones, suggesting (confirming) that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
makes this estimate not significant.   
Results of estimation of the model where the treatment group are married women “tout 
court” and the control group are cohabiting ones (see Section 4 for more details, and Table 5 
for descriptive statistics) are given in Table 8.  Here we find no significant impact of the 
programme in the pooled logit and probit models without covariates.  A negative and weakly 
significant (at the 10% level) impact of the tax credit on employment shows up in the panel 
logit without covariates.   This effect becomes statistically significant at the 5% level when 
covariates are introduced, in the same model.  The estimated marginal effect is now half the 
size of that in the model without covariates, passing from about 1% to 0.5%, which suggests 
that the tax credit has reduced employment of married women by about 20000 jobs in year 
2002.  The “γ” estimate is negative and weakly significant, at the 10% level, also in the 
pooled logit and probit models with covariates, giving slightly larger marginal effects, as 
reasonable, given that these estimates are less precise than in the panel data model.  
To sum up, according to the different models estimated, one can conclude in favour of a 
non-significant impact of the tax credit on the employment rate of French women.   There is, 
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however, some evidence of a negative and weakly significant employment effect of the 
programme for married women.  This would amount, according to our estimates, to an 
employment reduction of twenty to fifty thousands jobs for married women in the policy year.   
 
8. Conclusions  
This paper provides an estimate of the impact of the French tax credit, “la Prime Pour 
l’Emploi”, on the employment rate of low-earnings women.  It represents the first evaluation 
study based on data posterior to the programme implementation.  It is also the first one to 
apply non-experimental evaluation methods.   
Like similar in-work benefits programmes, the French tax credit is expected to increase 
the incentives to work for non-employed persons. However, it may decrease incentives to 
work for (married) secondary-earners, as found in the American EITC literature.  
We test here for the employment effects of the policy on women by applying a standard 
non-experimental evaluation method, a “difference-in-differences” approach.  Different 
treatment and control groups are defined to test for the robustness of our estimates of the 
policy effect.  In particular, one of specifications adopted is based on the eligibility rules, to 
set the boundaries for the control and the treatment group.  The other one identifies the policy 
impact for married women, by defining married women as the treatment group and cohabiting 
women as the control group.  It turns out that under the latter approach, the two groups   
compare fairly well.   
The survey data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from the French Labour Force 
Surveys of years 2000 to 2002.  The rotating structure of the survey enables us to apply panel 
data methods to the estimation of the model.  We also estimate pooled logit and probit of the 
employment probability to get more insights into the policy effects.  
On the basis of the results of estimation, we conclude in favour of a non-significant 
impact of the tax credit on the employment rate of French women.  We find, however, some 
evidence of a negative and weakly significant employment effect of the programme for 
married women.  This would amount, according to our estimates, to an employment reduction 
of twenty to fifty thousands jobs for married women in the policy year. 
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Table 1.  
 
Earnings and income thresholds for eligibility to 
the tax credit, in euros, 2001 rules.  
  Earnings thresholds   Income threshold(*) 
 Lower  Upper     
      
Single women  3187  14872  11772# 
      
Married 
women (a)  3187 14872 23544 
      
These thresholds relate, respectively, to annual taxable individual earnings and 
total taxable household income.   
# Notice that overall tax rules are such that total income is taxed at a lower rate 
than earnings from work, which implies that the (taxable) income threshold for 
single is not necessarily below the earnings from work.   
(*) The income threshold is increased by 3253 euros for each dependent child.    
(a)The upper earnings threshold is equal to 22654 euros for married women 
whose husband is out of work or earns less than the lower earnings threshold.  
 
 
Table 2.         Amounts of tax credit payable, 2001 rules.  
Earnings from work, per year, euros    Tax credit, per year, euros  
Lower bound  Upper bound   
0 3187  0% 
3187  10623*  4,4% * earnings 
10623* 14872*  (14872-earnings)*5,5%  (#) 
(*)These are defined in terms of full-time equivalent earnings.  
# This percentage was changed to 11% as from 2002 and applied to the 2002 
earnings but it is not obvious that respondents to the March 2002 LFS would be 
already aware of this and, moreover, they would not have had time to adapt 
their behaviour to this change.   
 
28 Elena G. F.  Stancanelli 
 
 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
   Year 2002  4 years sample 
Variable name  mean   SD  mean   SD 
Age 36.65  8.18  36.71  8.19 
Experience 17.65  9.48  17.79  9.47 
Education 1,  CEP  0 .23  0.42  0.24  0.43 
Education  2, BEPC  0.08  0.27  0 .08  0.27 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.26  0.44  0.26  0.44 
Education  4, BAC  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.37 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.35 
Married 0.49  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Cohabitant 0.25  0.43  0.25  0.43 
Single 0.26  0.44  0.25  0.43 
Children number   1.32  1.18  1.33  1.19 
Any child of age <3 years  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.35 
Paris 0.15  0.36  0.15  0.36 
small city  0.41  0.49  0.42  0.49 
large city  0.22  0.41  0.21  0.41 
Ile de France  0.18  0.38  0.18  0.38 
French nationality  0.91  0.28  0.92  0.28 
Employed 0.71  0.45  0.71  0.45 
Hourly salary obs.,FF   53.91  36.31  51.36  30.95 
Hourly pred., FF  45.18  13.18  44,84  12.34 
Husband's employed*  0.92  0.27  0.92  0.27 
Husband's income*, FF  11413.11 5937.21  9845.09  5314.94 
Observations no.  23530    96798   
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and cohabiting 
women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only and computed 
on a monthly basis.  
 




Descriptive statistics of treatment and control 
groups, constructed using eligibility rules  
    Treatment  group   Control group  
Variable name  Mean   SD   mean   SD 
        
Age    36.62  8.01 38.21 7.43 
Experience   18.65  9.38     
Education 1,  CEP  0.31  0.46  0.03  0.18 
Education  2, BEPC    0.10  0.30  0.03  0.17 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.32  0.47  0.10  0.31 
Education  4, BAC  0.17  0.37  0.13  0.34 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.08  0.27  0.37  0.48 
Married 0.55  0.50  0.61  0.49 
Cohabitant 0.17  0.38  0.21  0.41 
Single   0.28  0.45  0.18  0.39 
Children number   1.47  1.18  1.11  1.10 
Any child of age <3 years  0.16  0.37  0.14  0.34 
Paris 0.11  0.32  0.27  0.44 
small city  0.45  0.50  0.33  0.47 
large city  0.21  0.41  0.22  0.41 
Ile de France    0.13  0.34  0.30  0.46 
French nationality    0.91  0.29  0.94  0.24 
Employed   0.66  0.47  0.82  0.39 
Ln hourly salary obs.,FF    3.76  0.30  4.11  2.97 
Ln hourly salary pred.FF   3.65  0.18  4.02  0.20 
Husband's employed*  0.90  0.31  0.99  0.11 
Husband's income*, FF  8674.61 3591.18 13753.81 7261.72 
Observations number  69352    14061   
Note: These statistics are computed over the 4 years period. 
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and cohabiting 
women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only and computed 
on a monthly basis.   The women’s hourly salary, both observed and predicted, is given in 
logarithms.  
 




Descriptive statistics of treatment and control 
groups: married women versus living together   
    Married women   Cohabiting women   
Variable name  Mean   SD   mean   SD 
Age   38.27  7.29  32.43  7.28 
Experience 19.66  8.60  13.06  8.90 
Education 1,  CEP    0.26  0.44  0.20  0.40 
Education  2, BEPC  0.09  0.28  0.07  0.26 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.28  0.45  0.26  0.44 
Education  4, BAC  0.15  0.36  0.18  0.39 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.14  0.34  0.16  0.37 
Children number   1.77  1.15  0.96  1.06 
Any child of age <3 years  0.17  0.37  0.21  0.41 
Paris 0.14  0.34  0.14  0.35 
small city  0.47  0.50  0.44  0.50 
large city  0.20  0.40  0.20  0.40 
Ile de France    0.16  0.37  0.17  0.37 
French nationality    0.89  0.32  0.96  0.19 
Employed   0.67  0.47  0.72  0.45 
Ln hourly salary obs.,FF   3.87  0.38  3.81  0.35 
Ln hourly salary pred.FF   3.77  0.26  3.70  0.27 
Husband's employed*  0.93  0.26  0.90  0.30 
Husband's income*, FF  10493.72 8586.88 8519.48  4346.69 
Observations number  48502    23812   
Note: These statistics are computed over the 4 years period. 
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and cohabiting 
women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only and computed on a 
monthly basis.  
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Table 6  Results of estimation : treatment based on eligibility rules  
  Estimates of the impact of the tax credit γ 
  All   Married   Unmarried   Singles  Cohabiting 
No covariates      
      
Logit , pooled data 
coefficient l  -0.181 -0.182  -0.284  -0.045 -0.146 
standard error   0.075 0.069  0.108 0.166  0.148 
marginal effect   -0.016** -0.016**  -0.020**  -0.023  0.011 
       
Probit, pooled data
coefficient   -0.097 -0.100 -0.146 -0.022 -0.067 
standard error   0.032 0.040 0.057 0.084 0.081 
marginal effect   -0.034** -0.037**  -0.50**  -0.007  -0.025 
       
Panel logit clusters 
Coefficient  -0.089 -0.067 -0.160 0.005 -0.095 
standard error  0.039 0.046 0.080 0.118 0.117 
marginal effect  -0.008** -0.005  -0.016** 0.018  -0.012 
       
With covariates   
   
Logit, pooled data  
coefficient   -0.011 -0.151 0.244  -0.087 
 
0.293 
standard error   0.063 0.073 0.123 0.169 0.168 
marginal effect   -0.016 -0.016**  0.020**  -0.023  0.011* 
       
Probit, pooled data
Coefficient  -0.001 -0.080 
 
0.143 -0.045  0.197 
standard error   0.035 0.042 0.065 0.086 0.093 
marginal effect   -0.000 -0.029*  0.045**  -0.013 0.069** 
       
Panel logit clusters 
coefficient  -0.027 -0.089 0.110  -0.063 0.135 
standard error  0.047 0.053 0.104 0.134 0.143 
marginal effect  -0.015 -0.013*  0.021  0.022 0.011 
       
Observations  83413 46621 36792 21849 14943 
Note: All models are estimated specifying robust standard errors. 
Marginal effects are computed as the difference between the (average) predicted probability 
of employment, with γ set equal to zero, and the same with γ set equal to one.   
The covariates included are a quadratic in age, the five education level dummies, the 
number of children, a dummy for the presence of young children aged less than three years, 
a dummy for living in the region of Paris, dummies accounting for the population size of the 
city of residence,  a dummy for French nationality, treatment and year dummies.  
Descriptives of the treatment and control group are given in Table 4.  
(**) indicates statistical significance at 5% level; (*) at 10% level.  
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Table 7  Sensitivity analysis  : treatment based on eligibility rules  
  Estimates of the impact of the tax credit γ 
  All   Married   Unmarried   Singles  Cohabiting 
No covariates      
      
Logit , pooled data 
coefficient l  -0.126 -0.146  -0.210  0.070 -0.107 
standard error   0.054 0.065  0.098 0.148  0.136 
marginal effect   -0.023** -0.021**  -0.028**  0.029  -0.025 
       
Probit, pooled data
coefficient   -0.066 -0.080 -0.106 0.036 -0.045 
standard error   0.030 0.037 0.052 0.075 0.075 
marginal effect   -0.023** -0.029**  -0.036** 0.011 0.016 
       
Panel logit clusters 
Coefficient  -0.011 -0.151 -0.120 0.080 -0.082 
standard  error  0.063 0.073 0.072 0.105 0.104 
marginal effect  -0.016  -0.016**  -0.023  0.024  -0.024 
       
With covariates   
   
Logit, pooled data  
coefficient   0.035 -0.129 0.307 0.032 0.290 
standard error   0.058 0.069 0.112 0.151 0.154 
marginal effect   0.023 -0.021*  0.028** 0.029  0.025* 
       
Probit, pooled data
Coefficient  0.026 -0.068* 0.185 0.020 0.202 
standard error   0.032 0.039 0.059 0.078 0.085 
marginal effect   0.009 -0.024*  0.056** 0.006 0.070** 
       
Panel logit clusters 
coefficient  0.005 -0.071 0.152 0.028 0.145 
standard error  0.043 0.049 0.091 0.118 0.126 
marginal effect  0.021 -0.017  0.028 0.028  0.024 
       
Observations  86158 47919 38239 22500 15739 
Note: Here the control group includes women earning up to the minimum wage more than 
the upper earnings threshold, whose earnings fall, therefore between, UWi and UWi+SMIC 
(see Section 4 at the bottom, for more details).  
All models are estimated specifying robust standard errors. 
Marginal effects are computed as the difference between the (average) predicted probability 
of employment, with γ set equal to zero, and the same with γ set equal to one.   
The covariates included are a quadratic in age, the five education level dummies, the 
number of children, a dummy for the presence of young children aged less than three years, 
a dummy for living in the region of Paris, dummies accounting for the population size of the 
city of residence,  a dummy for French nationality, treatment and year dummies.  
Descriptives of the treatment and control groups are given in Table F in the Appendix to the 
paper.  
(**) indicates statistical significance at 5% level; (*) at 10% level.  
 




Results of estimation : treatment based 
on marital status in the policy year  
 
Estimates of the impact of the tax credit 
γ 
 coefficient  standard error   marginal effect   
No covariates    
    
Logit , pooled data  -0.033 0.041 -0.002
 
Probit, pooled data -0.019 0.024 -0.007
 




Logit, pooled data   -0.082 0.044 -0.002*
 
Probit, pooled data -0.047 0.026 -0.016*
 
Panel logit clusters  -0.073 0.035 -0.005**
 
Observations 72311
Note: All models are estimated specifying robust standard errors. 
The covariates included are a quadratic in age, the five education level 
dummies, the number of children, a dummy for the presence of young 
children aged less than three years, a dummy for living in the region of 
Paris, dummies accounting for the population size of the city of 
residence, a dummy for French nationality, treatment (marital status) and 
year dummies.  
Descriptives of the treatment and control group are given in Table 5.  
(**) indicates statistical significance at 5% level; (*) at 10% level. 
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Appendix   
 
Table A 
Results of estimation of the panel logit model, with 
clusters, of Table 7 (see equation 6 in the paper) 
   
  All   Married 
  Coefficient St.  error Coefficient  St. error 
Eligible to the tax credit  0.256**  0.033  0.429**  0.045 
Eligible in 2002  -0.027  0.047  -0.089*  0.053 
1999 -0.075**  0.015  -0.066**  0.019 
2001 0.013  0.015  0.020  0.019 
2002 0.062  0.046  0.132**  0.051 
Age   0.259**  0.011  0.350**  0.018 
Age squared   -0.003**  0.0001  -0.004**  0.0002 
education 1, CEP  -1.733**  0.053  -1.857**  0.074 
education  2, BEPC  -1.135** 0.057 -1.332**  0.080 
education 3, BEP-CAP  -0.951** 0.051 -1.133**  0.080 
education  4, BAC  -0.586**  0.053  -0.815**  0.072 
education  5, BAC + 2  0.055**  0.054  -0.124**  0.069 
Any child of age <3 years  -0.568**  0.022  -0.515**  0.029 
child number   -0.472**  0.010  -0.474**  0.013 
French nationality   0.699**  0.035  0.763**  0.043 
region of Paris   0.537**  0.033  0.502**  0.043 
small city   0.137**  0.024  0.214**  0.033 
large city   -0.019  0.029  0.028  0.039 
Constant   -3.776**  0.209  -5.637**  0.343 
Observations no.  83413    46621   
Clusters no.   54767    30005   
Wald Test (χ2, 18)  8754.98    4495.30   
Note:  the model estimated is a panel logit with clustered observations and robust standard 
errors.  The treatment coefficient was already reported in Table 6.  Here we give results of 
estimation for all covariates included in the model.  
(**) indicates statistical significance at 5% level; (*) at 10% level. 
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Table B  Results of estimation of the wage model  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
hourly wage.  
 
The dependent variable of the selection equation is the probability  
of employment  
  Wage equation  Probit of participation 
Variable name  coefficient SE coefficient  SE 
Age 0.037** 0.017 0.049 0.063 
age squared  -0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.002 
age cube  0.000008** 0.000004 -0.00002 0.00002 
experience 0.009** 0.002 0.0009 0.007 
experience squared  -0.0006** 0.00005 0.0002 0.0002 
education  CEP  -0.665** 0.00005 -1.131** 0.050 
education  BEPC  -0.527** 0.013 -0.705** 0.052 
education BEP-CAP  -0.490** 0.011 -0.593** 0.045 
education  BAC  -0.355** 0.010 -0.333** 0.043 
education  BAC + 2  -0.165** 0.009 0.042 0 .044 
region of Paris   0.138** 0.006 0.205** 0.026 
Constant 3.143** 0.204 -0.458 0.732 
married -0.014 0.022 
cohabitant -0.048* 0.025 
any child of age <3 
years -0.413** 0.025 
Children’s number   -0.217** 0.009 
French nationality  0.227** 0.030 
Lambda 0.229** 0.007 
Observations   22731  
Censored obs.    7298  
Note:  This model is estimated on data drawn from the full sample selected for year 2000, 
for which descriptives are given in Table C below.  
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Source: Own computation on French Labour Force Surveys 1990-2002.  Weighted statistics.  
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Table C  Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
   Year 2000    Year 2002  
Variable name  mean   SD   mean   SD 
Age 36.77  8.22  36.65  8.18 
Experience 18.00  9.51  17.65  9.48 
Education 1,  CEP  0.25  0.43  0 .23  0.42 
Education  2, BEPC  0.08  0.28  0.08  0.27 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.27  0.44  0.26  0.44 
Education  4, BAC  0.16  0.36  0.16  0.37 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.14  0 .35  0.15  0.36 
Married  0.50 0.50 0.49  0.50 
Cohabitant  0.24 0.43 0.25  0.43 
Single  0.26 0.44 0.26  0.44 
Children number   1.33  1.20  1.32  1.18 
Any child of age <3 years  1.14  0.35  0.15  0.36 
Paris  0.15 0.36 0.15  0.36 
small  city  0.41 0.49 0.41  0.49 
large  city  0.21 0.41 0.22  0.41 
Ile de France  0.17  0.38  0.91  0.28 
French  nationality  0.92 0.28 0.18  0.38 
Employed  0.70 0.46 0.71  0.45 
Hourly salary obs.,FF   50.71  28.26 53.91  36.31 
Hourly salary pred., FF  44.00  12.87 45.17  13.18 
Husband's  employed*  0.92 0.27 0.92  0.27 
Husband's income*, FF  10798.29 7668.44  11413.11 5937.21 
Observations  no.  24683  23532   
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and 
cohabiting women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only and 
computed on a monthly basis.  
 





Descriptive statistics of the treatment and 
control groups, on the basis of eligibility 
rules, year 2002 
   Treatment    Control 
Variable name  mean   SD   mean   SD 
Age 36.52  8.00  38.36  7.32 
Experience 18.32  9.33  16.53  9.07 
Education 1,  CEP  0.28  0.45  0.19  0.14 
Education  2, BEPC  0.10  0.31  0.02  0.13 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.32  0.47  0.06  0.24 
Education  4, BAC  0.18  0.38  0.12  0.32 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.09  0.28  0.39  0.49 
Married 0.53  0.50  0.65  0.48 
Cohabitant 0.20  0.40  0.15  0.36 
Single 0.27  0.45  0.20  0.40 
Children number   1.46  1.15  1.07  1.15 
Any child of age <3 years  0.18  0.38  0.12  0.32 
Paris 0.11  0.31  0.27  0.44 
small city  0.47  0.50  0.33  0.47 
large city  0.21  0.40  0.22  0.41 
Ile de France  0.13  0.34  0.30  0.46 
French nationality  0.91  0.28  0.93  0.25 
Employed 0.68  0.47  0.84  0.36 
Ln hourly salary obs.,FF  3.80  0.32  4.16  0.39 
Ln hourly salary pred FF 3.66  0.16  4.06  0.16 
Husband's employed*  0.90  0.30  0.99  0.11 
Husband's income*, FF  9281.78 4436.55 14347.53 7527.26 
Observations  no.  16892   3203  
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and 
cohabiting women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only 
and computed on a monthly basis.  
 




Descriptive statistics of treatment and control 
groups, married women: eligibility rules  
    Treatment  group   Control group  
Variable name  Mean   SD   mean   SD 
        
Age    37.66  7.28 39.75 6.89 
Experience   19.87  8.63  18.50  8  .73 
Education 1,  CEP  0.32  0.46  0.02  0.18 
Education  2, BEPC    0.11  0.31  0.03  0.17 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.33  0.47  0.09  0.28 
Education  4, BAC  0.16  0.37  0.14  0.34 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.07  0.26  0.44  0.50 
Children number   1.80  1.13  1.52  1.10 
Any child of age <3 years  0.17  0.38  0.15  0.36 
Paris 0.10  0.30  0.22  0.42 
small city  0.51  0.50  0.37  0.48 
large city  0.19  0.39  0.23  0.42 
Ile de France    0.13  0.33  0.26  0.44 
French nationality    0.89  0.32  0.93  0.26 
Employed   0.64  0.48  0.79  0.41 
Ln hourly salary obs.,FF    3.76  0.30  4.15  0.37 
Ln hourly salary pred.FF   3.60  0.16  4.05  0.20 
Husband's employed*  0.91  0.28  1.00  0.28 
Husband's income*, FF  8925.88 3551.39 15085.28 7474.27 
Observations number  38062    8559   
Note: These statistics are computed over the 4 years period. 
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and cohabiting 
women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only and computed 
on a monthly basis.  
 




Descriptive statistics of the treatment and 
control groups, on the basis of eligibility 
rules, year 2002:  a larger control group.  
   Treatment    Control 
Variable name  mean   SD   mean   SD 
Age 36.52  8.00  39.26  7.32 
Experience 18.32  9.33  17.16  8.81 
Education 1,  CEP  0.28  0.45  0.17  0.13 
Education  2, BEPC  0.10  0.31  0.015  0.12 
Education 3, BEP-CAP  0.32  0.47  0.05  0.23 
Education  4, BAC  0.18  0.38  0.10  0.30 
Education  5, BAC + 2  0.09  0.28  0.36  0.48 
Married 0.53  0.50  0.64  0.48 
Cohabitant 0.20  0.40  0.15  0.36 
Single 0.27  0.45  0.21  0.41 
Children number   1.46  1.15  1.10  1.16 
Any child of age <3 years  0.18  0.38  0.11  0.31 
Paris 0.11  0.31  0.30  0.46 
small city  0.47  0.50  0.31  0.46 
large city  0.21  0.40  0.22  0.41 
Ile de France  0.13  0.34  0.33  0.47 
French nationality  0.91  0.28  0.93  0.25 
Employed 0.68  0.47  0.84  0.36 
Ln hourly salary obs.,FF  3.80  0.32  4.18  0.39 
Ln hourly salary pred FF 3.66  0.16  4.10  0.16 
Husband's employed*  0.90  0.30  0.99  0.11 
Husband's income*, FF  9281.78 4436.55 14347.53 7527.26 
Observations  no.  16892   3798  
Note:  Here the control group includes women earning up to the minimum wage more 
than the upper earnings threshold, whose earnings fall, therefore between, UWi and 
UWi+SMIC (see Section 4 at the bottom, for more details).  
(*) The mean of partner's employment status is computed only for married and 
cohabiting women.  The salary of the husband is averaged over positive values only 
and computed on a monthly basis.  
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